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ABSTRACT
Electrification of urban transportation is on the rise. In April 2016, ridesharing company
Téo Taxi launched a plug-in electric vehicle (PEV) fleet followed four months later by
Uber. In 2020 Volkswagen will start a fully-electric carsharing platform, whereas other
companies such as BMW already provide such a service. When driven, an electric vehicle
garners profit for the platform through transportation. When parked, it can act as a con-
trollable storage device either consuming surplus or injecting energy to the grid. Hence,
managed PEV fleets provide unique grid-support opportunities, and added profits to the
platform through vehicle-to-grid services. This thesis looks into two types of sharing
economy business models with electric vehicles, namely the ride- and carsharing models.
The former type of platform has transactional control over the vehicles, that is, private
drivers respond to monetary incentives. The latter directly controls its fleet. This thesis
develops a mathematical framework to analyze the aforementioned models through queu-
ing theory. It characterizes viable control strategies for the platforms to co-optimize their
revenues from both transportation and grid services. It develops profit maximization al-
gorithms of the PEV fleet managers providing such services. Finally, variables of interest
are plotted as a function of various platform parameters.
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Electric vehicles are increasing in number over the recent years. Electric vehicles are inter-
esting from an engineering perspective since, among other viewpoints, they can be viewed
as mobile batteries. The electric energy which they can provide or absorb by charging
and discharging their batteries gives rise to new possibilities for the electrical power sys-
tem, such as frequency regulation and peak shaving using electric vehicles, services com-
monly referred to as vehicle-to-grid services. Depending on the type of the electric vehicle
charger (uni- or bidirectional), only some of the services can be provided.
Moreover, business models which traditionally focused on the transportation sector can
benefit from the added electrical energy functionalities of an electric vehicle. For example,
transportation sharing economy business models such as car- and ridesharing may utilize
electric vehicles to gain an extra revenue stream, by offering vehicle-to-grid services. In
this work we will focus on the aforementioned case. We will analyze the interaction be-
tween two types of sharing economy businesses, namely ride- and carsharing, their users
or customers, and the receiver of their vehicle-to-grid services. Parts of this work appear
in [1, 2].
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1.1 Rapid adoption of electric vehicles
Conventional or gasoline-powered vehicles have dominated the car market. Gasoline-
powered light vehicle sales alone are expected to reach 8.2 million in 2030 in the US
[3]. Even though pollution is not solely due to conventional vehicles, electric vehicles
have gained favor as a remedy to the pollution caused by conventional vehicles. Com-
bined with advancements in battery technology and increasing oil prices, electric vehicles
have now drawn a lot of attention, to the point that the forecasted number of total elec-
tric vehicles sales for the year 2030 — that is, combined sales of battery-electric vehicles
(BEV), plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEV) and hybrid electric vehicles (HEV) —
will reach approximately 1.15 million according to the U.S. Energy Information Adminis-
tration (EIA) and approximately 3.35 million in 2050, as can be seen in Fig. 1.1. In all of
North America, electric vehicles sales in year 2030 are estimated at 5.4 million units [4].
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• Battery-electric vehicle (BEV) sales increase from less than 1% of total U.S. vehicle sales in 2017 to 12%
in 2050. Plug-in hybrid electric vehicle (PHEV) sales increase from less than 1% to 2% over the same
period.
• California’s Zero-Emission Vehicle regulation, which has been adopted by nine additional states, requires 
a minimum percentage of vehicle sales of electric and plug-in hybrid vehicles. In 2025, the year the 
regulation and new federal fuel economy standards go into full effect, projected sales of BEV and PHEV 
vehicles reach 1.1 million, or about 7% of projected total vehicle sales in the Reference case.
• Sales of the longer-ranged 200- and 300-mile electric vehicles grow over the entire projection period,
tempering sales of the shorter-range 100-mile electric vehicles and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles.
—driven by state policies, more models offering longer driving-range 
capabilities, and battery cost reductions
Figure 1.1: Projected total electric vehicle sales (BEV plus PHEV plus HEV) up to year
2050.
Moreover, electric vehicles are selling at a faster pace as seen in Fig. 1.2, where the
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time to sell 1 million electric vehicles is increasing over the years.
Figure 1.2: Cumulative global EV sales in millions.
Furthermore, an increase in the minimum number of electric vehicles on the US roads
is guaranteed by the State of California Zero Emission Vehicle regulation, which now in-
cludes a minimum percentage of electric and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles sales, starting
from the year 2025 and onwards. This regulation has been adopted by 9 more states.
The aforementioned increasing electric vehicle adoption rate can be attributed to the
increasing battery energy density (i.e. energy per unit volume) and reduced battery cost
from $1000/kWh in 2010, to $200/kWh in 2016 to the projected $100/kWh in a few years
(Fig. 1.3, from the International Energy Agency website). The former increases the bat-
tery longevity assuming identical driving behavior before and after using a higher energy
density battery. Therefore range anxiety (i.e. the concern among drivers that the electric
vehicle battery will be discharged before they reach their destination) will ease over the
years. The latter addresses price concerns.
3
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The 2016 cost and energy density assessment draws from the results developed by the US DOE (Howell, 
2017). The assessment aims to reflect the production cost of technologies that are currently being 
researched once they achieve commercial-scale, high-volume production (US DOE, 2017). The US DOE 
estimate is higher than the USD 180/kWh to USD 200/kWh range of battery pack costs announced recently 
by GM and LG Chem (Ayre, 2015) or Tesla and Panasonic (Field, 2016; Lambert, 2016a, 2016b) for batteries 
that will be used in new EV models. The estimates are also lower than the costs estimates for commercially 
available technologies reported in other assessments, which range between USD 300/kWh (Slowik et al., 
2016) and USD 500/kWh (US DOE, 2017). Overall, this confirms that technologies currently in the R&D 
stage have better performance than those available on the market. Since the cost estimates for the scale-
up of lab-scale technologies are projections of the expected costs in three to five years for high-volume 
production (US DOE, 2017),12 the assessment suggests that battery costs will continue to decline. 
Figure 6 • Evolution of battery energy density and cost 
Notes: Contrary to the results assessed for 2009-15, which targeted PHEV batteries, the 2016 estimates of costs and volumetric 
energy density by the US DOE (costs are to be interpreted as projections for the high-volume production of technologies currently 
being researched) refer to a battery pack that is designed to deliver 320 km of all-electric range and is, therefore, suitable for BEVs. 
The latest update of this cost assessment was developed accounting for an advanced lithium-ion technology (with silicon alloy-
composite anode). Being a technology that is still being researched today, this is currently deemed to have a greater cost but also a 
larger potential for cost reductions compared with conventional lithium-ion technologies. 
Sources: Howell (2017), EV Obsession (2015) and Cobb (2015a). 
Key point: Prospects for future cost reductions from the main families of battery technologies confirm the encouraging 
signs in cost and performance improvements observed over the past decade. 
Expansions in production volumes and pack size bear the capacity to reduce unit costs (Howell, 2017). 
According to the US DOE, increasing production volumes from 25 000 units to 100 000 units for a BEV 
(100 kWh) battery pack allows a cut in battery pack production costs per kWh by 13%. Other studies 
confirm that production volume is a key factor in battery pack cost reduction: battery pack production 
volumes of over 200 000 battery packs per year are estimated to cost USD 200/kWh or less. This is roughly 
one-third lower than the USD 300/kWh estimated for production volumes ranging between 10 000 and 
30 000 units in 2015 (Slowik et al., 2016). 
Increasing the pack size from 60 kWh to 100 kWh (roughly reflecting, in the case of an average car sold in 
the United States, an increase in range from 200 km to 320 km) would also lead to a 17% reduction in cost 
per kWh at the pack level (Howell, 2017). 
12 Looking at the historical assessment of technologies being researched (Figure 6) against the costs estimated for 
commercially available applications today also suggests that lab-scale technologies tend to be three to five years ahead when 
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Figure 1.3: Electric vehicle battery cost and volumetric energy density up to year 2022
a d futur potenti l. Sour e: U.S. En rgy Information Administration.
Moreover, battery costs of electric vehicles are not only decreasing in absolute value but
also as a percentage of the total vehicle cost, projected to reach 18% of the total vehicle
cost in 2030 as seen in Fig. 1.4.
Figure 1.4: Battery and other costs of an electric vehicle from year 2016 up to year 2030.
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1.2 Vehicle-to-grid services
The improvements in battery technology already discussed give electric vehicles the func-
tionality of offering demand-response services to the grid (or large loads, such as com-
mercial and industrial loads). These services are referred to as vehicle-to-grid services.
Such services include ancillary services such as spinning reserves, peak power shaving,
and frequency regulation, which are graphically shown in Fig. 1.5. The infrastructure
which allows vehicle-to-grid services is the electric vehicle chargers. The chargers are
divided into three levels depending on their power rating. The chargers which use alter-
nating current are either level 1 (meaning their power rating is below 3.7 kW) which are
typically found in homes, or level 2 (power rating 3.7 kW - 22 kW) which are used in
homes, stations and highways. Level 3 chargers, typically found in charging stations and
highways, are either alternating current (power rating 22 kW - 43.5 kW) or direct current
(power rating up to 200 kW) chargers.
Vehicle-to-grid services can either use the vehicle as a passive device, i.e. only absorb-
ing power, or as an active device, i.e. also being able to inject power to the grid. The former
is called unidirectional vehicle-to-grid service, and the latter bidirectional. Bidirectional
service can only take place when bidirectional chargers are used. Not all chargers can
provide bidirectional power flow; they are in general more complex and expensive than
unidirectional chargers mainly because of their control components.
Unidirectional services can include frequency regulation and load curtailment. In this
case, frequency regulation refers to the variability of the grid frequency because of in-
termittent renewable energy generation and variable loads. Electric vehicles can help by
absorbing power from the grid (that is, by charging their batteries) when frequency is
higher than normal, returning it to the normal levels. Because of unpredicted factors (e.g.
renewable energy) supply may fall short of demand, in which case some loads (demand)
need to be cut out, or equivalently, they need to be curtailed, so that supply meets demand.
In such cases, the electric vehicles can act as sellers of load curtailment, by volunteering to
stop charging after they are paid a price by the grid. This way, the power which previously
flowed towards the vehicles can be reallocated to other loads.
Bidirectional services also include load curtailment. However, curtailment of electric
5
Figure 1.5: An overview of vehicle-to-grid (V2G) ancillary services.
vehicles may not be enough, and more load may need to be curtailed, because the grid
remains unable to supply all of the remaining load. In this case, and because of the bidi-
rectional service, the (partially) charged curtailed vehicles can use their pre-curtailment
stored energy to act as a backup power supply for those loads that are about to be cur-
tailed, thus preventing (some of) these loads from being curtailed by the grid. Frequency
regulation in this case involves electric vehicles which can also discharge (apart from
charge) their batteries thus providing power to the grid, increasing the frequency to its
nominal value. Another service is energy arbitrage, which is charging batteries at low
cost, e.g. at nighttime, and using it during the day, thus avoiding the high electricity prices
associated with charging during the day. Another service is spinning reserves, where the
vehicles act as generators ready to serve the grid when it needs power due to unexpected
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circumstances (e.g. because a generator tripped). For this service, electric vehicles need
to be parked at the chargers for the contracted amount of time, so they can answer calls
during that time. Also energy storage is possible, and this allows the vehicles to return
the stored energy back to the grid during peak hours, which mitigates the variability of
the supply due to the intermittent nature of renewable energy sources, thus reducing the
variability of electricity prices. The concept of energy storage is distinctly related to peak
shaving and valley filling, which is a service that keeps the total power generation from
conventional sources relatively flat, by providing power from the vehicle battery to the
grid (through discharging) during peak times, thus reducing the required amount of con-
ventional power production. Similarly, the service helps to increase the power output from
conventional sources when the output becomes too low (e.g. because of amble renew-
able generation at that time) in times of reduced demand (valleys), by letting the vehicle
battery absorb power from the grid (through charging). Relatively flat generation profile
from conventional sources is beneficial because then conventional sources have to meet
shorter demand peaks (thus shorter ramp up durations), and valleys of decreased demand
are shallower (thus fewer sources need to be shut down to meet the reduced demand);
shorter ramp-up durations and fewer sources needing to be shut down reduce operational
costs of those sources.
Sharing economy business models in the transportation sector could leverage vehicle-
to-grid services to add a second stream of revenue. The business models we will focus
on in this work are ridesharing (sometimes referred to as ridesourcing) and carsharing.
Ridesharing companies traditionally provided transportation services by matching drivers
with passengers requesting a ride. However, a company equipped with an electrical vehi-
cle fleet could match those drivers with entities in need of vehicle-to-grid services. Those
entities will sign an appropriate contract with the company so when the former is in need
of those vehicle-to-grid services, the latter will supply it with enough electric vehicles to
accommodate its needs. The challenge for a ridesharing company employing an electri-
cal fleet is to design profit maximization algorithms which optimally split its driver pool
between the transportation services and the vehicle-to-grid (V2G) services, by offering
appropriate (monetary) incentives.
Carsharing companies employing a fully electric fleet can use their electric vehicles to
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provide V2G services when their cars are parked inside a facility or at parking spots. Ac-
cording to the San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency’s “On-Street Car Sharing
Pilot Program Evaluation Report” [5], the average on-street carshare vehicle sits unused
for 18 hours a day. Therefore, any carsharing company can offer V2G services to garner
additional revenue when the vehicles are idle. For this case, we will develop profit maxi-
mization algorithms which will allow optimal management of the battery capacity during





Ridesharing systems are encouraging drivers in their fleets to adopt electric vehicles and
may therefore be able to provide not only transportation services to passengers but also
energy services to power grid operators through appropriate contracts. This chapter devel-
ops a queuing network model of such ridesharing platforms where drivers may decide, at
any given time, whether to provide transportation or grid services based on the incentives
offered by the ridesharing platform. Then it considers designing driver incentives to max-
imize revenue for the ridesharing platform, via an analysis of the reward structure and an
optimization algorithm. Platform revenue is assessed for various system parameters under
optimal incentives.
2.1 Context
As transportation systems transition to a greater reliance on plug-in electric vehicles (EVs),
not only will there be a strong coupling between transit and electrical grid networks [6]
but also the possibility of efficiency gains through their joint control. In treating EVs as
distributed energy resources (DERs), options for provisioning grid services include both
serving as energy sources and sinks, as well as providing functions such as voltage and
frequency regulation [7, 8, 9, 10]. Here we examine the dual role of these mobile batteries
in electrified transportation within the context of the sharing economy [11]. The sharing
economy includes online platforms that mediate the sharing of goods and services by
crowd-based agents responding to various incentives.
In particular, we consider ridesharing services, such as Uber and Lyft, where platforms
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incentivize individual driver/car-owners to provide rides and match them to customers
seeking rides.1 Note that ridesharing fleets are increasingly composed of EVs [14, 15]. If
the ridesharing platform were to contract with an electrical utility or a retail aggregator, it
could then develop an incentive scheme for drivers to both provide transportation and grid
services. At any given time, then, drivers would face the choice of service type—a new
kind of multihoming where the choice is not between two different platforms such as Uber
and Lyft but between two different services on the same platform. Analyzing the driver’s
choice and optimizing the platform’s incentive structure is the focus herein.
In developing mathematical models of two-sided markets that arise in sharing econ-
omy platforms, it is of increasing interest to specifically consider dynamics and random
arrivals of workers and tasks, modeled as queuing processes [16, 17, 18]. We adopt a
queuing network formalism for performance analysis—as has become standard in a va-
riety of application domains including communication networks, manufacturing systems,
and computer systems [19]—largely since equilibrium analysis of queues allows insights
into an inherently dynamic process without requiring full transient analysis as in optimal
control approaches. Here, we specifically extend the queuing-theoretic model of rideshar-
ing systems due to Banerjee, Riquelme, and Johari [20] by including a further grid service
queue for drivers to choose, yielding a Jackson network and associated equilibrium analy-
sis [21, 22].
The main contributions of this chapter are:
• A driver-centric mathematical model of an EV ridesharing platform with both trans-
portation and grid services,
• Characterization of the driver response to incentive schemes, and
• Optimization of platform revenue through design of the incentive scheme (both re-
ward characterization and an optimization algorithm).
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Firstly, the queuing system model
for EV drivers providing transportation and energy services through a ridesharing platform
1Note that by ridesharing, we do not mean the pooling of passengers in the same vehicle [12, 13], though
in our abstraction of customers, this is allowed.
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is defined in Section 2.2. Also, the problem that the platform seeks to solve for selecting
the prices for these two kinds of services is posed in Section 2.3. In Section 2.4, the
properties of its reward structure are analyzed, and in Section 2.5, an algorithm to optimize
the prices and illustrate how these prices and the platform’s reward vary with various
parameters of the model is provided. Section 2.6 concludes the chapter with a discussion
of interesting directions stemming from this chapter.
2.2 Ridesharing platform as a queueing system
Consider a peer-to-peer ridesharing company A which sports an all-electric vehicle fleet.
A helps the drivers to match with two kinds of service requests—providing transportation
services to passengers, and utilizing their vehicle as mobile batteries. The second kind of
service requires drivers to utilize a portion of their car batteries to transact energy at desig-
nated outlets. Consider the scenario where A may offer this service to a retail aggregator
who sells the aggregated capacity from the drivers in the wholesale market. That capac-
ity can be utilized to provide energy, regulation, or reserve services. A can also sell this
aggregated battery capacity to commercial and industrial (C&I) loads that seek to reduce
their peak power consumption in order to reduce peak demand charges. In the sequel, call
the requests to A for utilizing battery capacity to provide power as ‘grid services’. We now
model the driver behavior and A’s business operation as a queuing network as shown in
Fig. 2.1.
2.2.1 The drivers and their preferences
Suppose drivers open A’s application to provide services following a Poisson process with
rate λ0. These drivers are joined by others that have already been providing services
through A’s app, and decide to re-enter the queue of drivers to serve again. If qe denotes
the probability that a driver leaves the app after providing a service, we have
λ0 +(1−qe)λ = λ =⇒ λ = λ0/qe.
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Figure 2.1: Queuing network model for A’s business.
Here, λ denotes the resulting Poisson rate of driver arrivals that are ready to serve. Let
drivers choose to serve the transportation and grid queues with probabilities proportional
to the expected payments from providing each service. More precisely, let A charge p1 per
unit time to each passenger for providing a ride. Then, A shares a γ < 1/2 fraction of it,
i.e., γ p1 with the driver, and keeps (1− γ)p1 for itself. Further, it pays a driver at the rate
p2 per unit time for providing grid services. The payment scheme then results in drivers
arriving at the transportation and the grid queues according to a Poisson process with rates
λ1 and λ2, where λ1/λ2 = γ p1/p2, implying
λ1 =
γ p1
γ p1 + p2
λ , λ2 =
p2
γ p1 + p2
λ .
The equations can equivalently be viewed as the result of the drivers’ rewards from the
transportation and grid services being independent exponentially distributed random vari-
ables with means γ1 p1 and p2, respectively. If drivers choose the service with the largest
reward, then the probability of choosing each service becomes proportional to the mean
reward from that service as we have assumed.
In our model, drivers who commit to providing transportation services will remain in the
transportation queue, even if no passengers seek a ride immediately, but do not switch to
the grid queue. We remark that the so-called sunk cost fallacy (loss aversion) in queuing
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systems explains such a modeling choice. People often decide to persist with a chosen
course of action, even when alternate and economically better actions are available, e.g.,
see [23, 24].
2.2.2 Modeling transportation service provision
Assume that passengers seeking a ride open A’s app according to a Poisson process with
rate µ1. They choose to use A’s services if the price of a ride p1 does not exceed its reser-
vation price. Let F denote the complementary cumulative distribution (tail distribution)
function of the reservation prices of consumers. Therefore, passengers who ultimately




Assume that the reservation wages take values in all of R+ with a finite expectation, de-
noted by E[pres]. The passenger arrival can therefore be modeled as a queuing process.
Additionally assume that, absent a driver, an arriving passenger immediately leaves. Akin
to that in [20], this assumption prevents the queue of passengers from growing unbounded.
The queue of available drivers sees exponentially distributed job sizes with average 1/µ ′1.
In Kendall’s notation, the available drivers form an M/M/1 queue to provide transport.
2.2.3 Modeling grid service provision
Next, we model the grid services. Consider a service request from A to the drivers that
asks them to park their car at a designated location for an exponentially distributed amount
of time with mean 1/µ2. When grid connected, the car relinquishes control over a portion
of the battery to A (or a third-party with whom A has a contract with). We model the
drivers providing the grid service as an M/M/∞ queuing process. That is, we assume
the number of available plug points for the electric vehicles to be large. We remark that
our modeling choices for the transportation and the grid queues render their departure
processes Poisson. As a result, drivers who provide a service and return to serve again
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follow a Poisson process as well. We have therefore modeled A’s business as an open
Jackson network, as shown in Figure 2.1.
Consider a contract between A and the party receiving the grid service that remunerates
A based on the total battery capacity made available for grid services. For simplicity, as-
sume that the battery capacity of each car, and the portion allotted to provide grid services,
are homogeneous across all drivers. Then, the capacity available to provide grid services
at any time is proportional to the number of cars plugged in. Let the contract be given by
two components—one a forward contract that pays for making a certain number of cars
available, and then a reward or penalty for abiding by or violating that contract. Let A earn
at a rate of f (θ) from the forward contract to make θ cars available, and a reward of R(k)
when k cars are connected in real time, where
R(k) :=
−c, if k < θ ,+c, otherwise. (2.1)
The reward structure is such that A pays a penalty when too few cars (< θ) are available
to provide energy services, and makes money otherwise. 2
A note on the thresholded reward structure:
Here, we justify the rationale behind our choice of the reward structure R. Consider the
example where the battery capacity from the vehicles is utilized by commercial and indus-
trial (C&I) loads to avoid peak demand charges—payments due to increased retail energy
price when energy use surpasses a certain threshold. Many have argued in favor of utiliz-
ing vehicle-to-grid services to avoid such payments, e.g., see [25]. For such services, the
energy capacity from the vehicles provides no benefit if it is below a certain threshold. In
addition, excess capacity beyond that threshold adds no value.
Another example service to motivate the reward structure is that of frequency regulation,
where assets respond to requests to adjust their power output every 2-4 seconds. These
2The penalty and the reward from grid service provision have identical magnitudes c; that assumption
can be easily relaxed.
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adjustments facilitate the second-by-second balance of demand and supply of power in the
grid. In current performance-based regulation markets, assets contract a certain capacity
against a forward payment, and are then paid in real time based on how closely they
follow the regulation signal. Capacity in excess of the forward contract does not garner
added revenue. The quality of tracking the regulation signal depends on the capacity
available in real time. Further, that quality affects procurements from that asset in future
market clearings. That is, an asset that regularly falls short of providing the contracted
capacity will ultimately find it challenging to be cleared in the market; see [26] for details
on regulation markets. A threshold reward structure emulates the payments from such
markets.
2.2.4 Computing A’s revenue rate
The rich literature on Jackson networks offers effective ways to analyze various properties
of the system in Fig. 2.1, when operating at steady-state. The equilibrium properties
provide insights into its long-term behavior. Of particular interest to us is the expected
revenue rate of A, the rate at which A earns in equilibrium, that we characterize in the next
result.
Proposition 1. The expected revenue rate of A is given by
rA(p1, p2) := (1− γ)λ1 p1−λ2 p2














for (z1,z2) ∈ N+×R+ is the regularized Gamma function.
Proof. The first and the second term in the right-hand side of (2.2) follow from multiplying
the rate at which drivers arrive at the two queues and the payments to the drivers. The
third term arises from the forward contract for grid service provision. We show that E[R],
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the expected reward from grid services, is given by the third term. Recall that the grid
queue is modeled as an M/M/∞ queue with arrival rate λ2 and service rate µ2. Then, the
stationary probability distribution of there being k cars at the grid queue is Poisson with























2.3 The platform’s price selection problem





subject to λ1 < µ1F(p1).
(2.3)
The constraint in (2.3) arises from stability considerations of the transportation queue. It
prevents unbounded increase in the number of drivers queued up to provide transportation
services. One of two cases may arise to ensure the stability of the transportation queue.
The rate of incoming drivers is low enough that the transportation queue remains stable
even if all drivers join it. Then, price for energy services does not affect the stability con-
siderations. Alternately, when transportation queue cannot handle all interested drivers,
then the grid price has to be high enough so as to attract enough drivers away from the
transportation queue. The stability constraint in (2.3) defines an open set. To sidestep pos-
sible difficulties in optimizing over an open set, we take a closure with the understanding
that µ1 can be suitably perturbed to keep the closed set feasible. The stability constraint
16
Figure 2.2: Variation of expected revenue rate with the prices. Parameters for the experi-
ment are given by λ = 1, µ1 = 65 , µ2 =
1
10 µ1, θ = 5, c = 10, γ =
1
4 , f = 0.
can be succinctly described as






:= pL2 , (2.4)
where we use the notation z+ := max{z,0}.
Analytical characterization of the optimal prices p∗1, p
∗
2 for (2.3) remains difficult. Naively
designing an algorithm to search for these prices can be challenging as well. Problem (2.3)
is nonconvex. Further, the variation of the reward rate as a function of the prices can be
quite complex, as Fig. 2.2 illustrates. Motivated to design an algorithm to optimize the re-
ward rate, we analyze the properties of rA that allow us to systematically narrow the search
space for the optimum. Since the forward contract f does not affect the optimization over
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prices, henceforth, assume f = 0.
2.4 Properties of the expected reward rate
The design of an algorithm to maximize the expected reward rate rA relies on understand-
ing how this rate varies with the prices for transportation and grid services. In this section,
we provide a sequence of results that capture its essential properties that will allow us to
derive such an algorithm in Section 2.5.
Our first result characterizes how rA varies as a function of the price for grid services
p2, holding the transportation price p1 constant. The following definition will prove useful











z−1e−xdx is the Gamma function for z ∈ R+.
Proposition 2 (Variation with p2). The expected reward rate satisfies limp2→∞ rA(·, p2) =
−∞. Also, ∂ rA
∂ p2
≤ 0, when
• p1 ≥ 11−γ pmax, p2 ≥ 0, or
• p1 < 11−γ pmax, p2 ≥ pU2 , where
pU2 :=−γ p1 +
√
γ p1 pmax− γ(1−2γ)p21. (2.5)









T1 := p22 +2γ p1 p2 + γ(1− γ)p21,









Notice that T1 is a strictly convex increasing function of p2, and T2 is a scaled density
function of the Gamma distribution evaluated at ρ2 with shape and scale parameters θ and
unity, respectively. The scaling factor is 2cγ p1/µ2. The mode of the Gamma distribution
occurs at θ −1, implying
T2 ≤ γ p1 pmax.






i.e., rA decreases at a rate of −λ towards −∞ for large p2.
A sufficient condition for ∂ rA
∂ p2
≤ 0 is given by
T1 ≥ γ p1 pmax.
The minimum of T1 occurs at zero, taking the value γ(1− γ)p21. Enforcing it to be greater
than the right-hand side of the above inequality, we get the first condition in the propo-
sition. Otherwise the crossing point of T1 with the right-hand side occurs at pU2 , and rA
always decreases for p2 > pU2 .
Owing to the above proposition, the search space for the optimizer of (2.3) reduces to
p1 ≥
1











where pL2 is defined in (2.4) from stability considerations of the transportation queue. Next,
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we present a result similar to Proposition 2, where we characterize the variation of the
expected reward rate with the transportation price alone, keeping the grid price constant.
Proposition 3 (Variation with p1). The expected reward rate satisfies limp1→∞ rA(p1, ·) =
∞. Also, ∂ rA
∂ p1
≥ 0, when
• p2 ≥ pmax, p1 ≥ 0 or,










(1−2γ)p22 + γ p2 pmax. (2.8)





(γ p1 + p2)
2 (T3−T4), (2.9)
where







Similar to the proof of Proposition 3, T4 ≤ p2 pmax. Then, a sufficient condition for ∂ rA∂ p1 to
be nonnegative is T3 ≥ p2 pmax. Here, T3 is a strictly convex increasing function of p2. The
possible crossing point for T3 with p2 pmax is given by pL1 in (2.8). For p2 ≥ pmax, one can
verify that pL1 ≤ 0, and hence, the required derivative is nonnegative for all p1.
20
Figure 2.3: The search space for the optimal prices includes pL2 and the shaded area.
The reservation prices were assumed to be exponentially distributed with mean 20. Other
parameters for the experiment are given by λ = 1, µ1 = 74 , µ2 =
1
5 µ1, θ = 5, c =
2
3 , γ =
1
4 .
Equipped with the above proposition, the search space for the optimal prices narrows





and (ii) along pL2 . See Fig. 2.3 for a graphical illustration. The next result argues that the
reward rate ultimately decreases in an unbounded fashion as the prices are increased along
the trajectory marking the boundary of the queue stability limit pL2 . Further, it provides
a bound on the maximum transportation price beyond which the reward rate reduces be-
low any given threshold, effectively reducing our search space to a bounded region. The
following notation will prove useful.
ψ := min{λ/µ1,1}.
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Proposition 4 (Variation along the queue stability limit). The expected reward rate
satisfies limp1→∞ rA(p1, p
L

























and E[pres] is the expected reservation price for passengers.
Proof. For p1 ≥ F−1(ψ), we have







λ1 = µ1F(p1),λ2 = λ −µ1F(p1),
for which Proposition 1 implies
rA(p1, pL2)



























The above follows from the properties of the regularized Gamma function. Further, from






that in turn allows us to deduce







The second term decreases to −∞ as p1 grows unbounded, completing the proof of the
first part of the proposition.
To prove the second part, we utilize the upper bound on the reward rate in (2.10) to





]+)2 ≥ η ′
for all p1 ≥ p1. If η ′ < 0, it suffices to choose p1 := F
−1










]+)2 ≥ µ21 ψ2F−1 (ψ/2)
4F(p1)
.
Requiring the right-hand side of the above equation to dominate η ′ for p ≥ p1 yields the
result.
The above result reveals that as A increases the transportation price p1, A loses busi-
ness from passengers, making the transportation queue prone to becoming unstable. To
maintain queue stability, such an increase in transportation price must accompany a corre-
sponding increase in the price for grid service provision. The stability limit is such that for
high values of these prices, most drivers essentially end up at the grid queue. A’s reward
from energy service provision being bounded above by c, the payout to the drivers in the
grid queue ultimately drags A’s revenue down towards −∞.
2.5 Maximizing the expected reward rate
Having analyzed the variation of rA with the prices in the last section, we now design a
search for the prices that maximize it in the following steps.
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Figure 2.4: Plots that illustrate the effect of parameter variations on the optimal prices and
expected reward rate for λ = 8( ), λ = 10( ), and λ = 12( ). In our experiments,
we use the parameters γ1 = 14 ,µ1 = 10,µ2,c = 15,θ = 5. The passenger reservation price
follows the gamma distribution with shape and scale parameters 2 and 1 respectively.
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× [0, pmax] and find the optimizer over
all points that satisfy three properties: p2 ≤ pU2 , p1 ≤ pL1 , and p2 ≥ pL2 .
• Call the optimal rA over the grid search as η .




, where p1 is defined as in Proposition 4 with η
from the last step.
• With each sample, run a gradient ascent on rA over the curve (p1, pL2) as p1 varies within[
F−1(ψ), p1
]
with step-sizes varying as O(1/
√
T ) in the T -th iteration.
• Output the maximum rA encountered.
Our analysis in Section 2.4 narrows the search for optimal prices to a bounded region.
One can utilize any nonlinear programming technique or randomized algorithms such as
simulated annealing to optimize rA over that bounded region. To explore that region, we
take a two-pronged approach—one over the shaded area in Fig. 2.3, where we do not know
how the partial derivatives of rA behave, and second, on the curve that encodes the stability
limit for the transportation queue. We cannot guarantee that the above algorithm produces
a global optimal reward rate. Gauging the suboptimality of our search is relegated to future
endeavors.
2.5.1 Variation of optimal rewards with model parameters
Figure 2.4 plots the effect of the variation of the parameters λ ,c,θ on the optimal prices
(p∗1, p
∗
2) and the corresponding expected reward rates r
∗
A. Increasing c increases the pos-
sible penalty from grid service provision. For low driver arrival rates, this penalty leads
to a reduction of r∗A. For higher values of λ , the corresponding increase in the possible
reward leads to an increase in r∗A with c beyond a threshold. Again for low values of c,
the potential for a small reward from the grid queue dictates that A chooses to send all
its drivers to the transportation queue by setting p∗2 = 0. As c increases, the possibility of
reward from the grid queue leads A to choose a nonzero price p∗2.
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As the threshold θ increases, the total expected revenue rate (without accounting for the
forward contract f (θ)) drops. We expect that behavior as larger θ binds A to bring more
cars to the grid to overcome this threshold, thereby having to pay the drivers to do so. The
variation of r∗A with θ sheds light on the nature of the forward contract f that A must sign.
Explicitly characterizing the forward contract is left for future work.
2.6 Chapter summary and future research suggestions
We have proposed a novel queuing model for ridesharing systems with electric vehicles
that can offer both transportation and grid services, and established an approach for opti-
mizing the platform’s revenue. Beyond the basic queuing model for transportation service
provision considered here, future work aims to study more detailed geographic factors.
Related to such geographic considerations, we also aim to further consider behavioral as-
pects of drivers’ choice behavior, such as range anxiety, the phenomenon experienced by
EV drivers in settings of insufficient energy replenishment infrastructure [27, 28]. This
would lead to a model with battery state dependence, which is mathematically interesting
in its own right. Finally, we believe the basic mathematical model we have developed and





Carsharing systems are adopting electric vehicles into their fleets and may therefore be
able to provide not only transportation services to drivers/passengers but also energy ser-
vices to the power grid through appropriate participation in electricity markets. This chap-
ter develops a queuing model of such carsharing platforms where cars may be deployed for
transportation services at a given price, but also for grid services during transportation-idle
periods through energy price arbitrage. The model provides a characterization of revenue
from each of these two streams. The chapter further finds optimal pricing and battery
splitting to maximize revenue for the carsharing platform, via an analysis of the reward
structure and an optimization algorithm. Platform revenue is assessed for various system
parameters under optimal operation.
3.1 Context
Automobiles have a certain flexibility in that they can act as both transportation resources
and as distributed energy resources. This dual-use flexibility of gasoline engines was ex-
ploited in the early twentieth century by car owners at the individual level, e.g. through
Model T-powered washing machines [29, Fig. 2]. The resurgence of modern plug-in elec-
tric vehicles (EVs), however, enables leveraging this flexibility at a large-scale systems
level through coupled control of transportation systems and energy grids [6], especially
in the context of the sharing economy [11]. Indeed on the energy side, EVs can not only
serve as both energy sources and sinks, but also provide voltage and frequency regulation
services to the smart grid [7, 8, 9, 10]. On the transportation side, business-to-peer car-
27
sharing platforms1 are starting to adopt electric vehicles within their fleets [30, 31, 32].
This is especially the case for automobile manufacturer-based platforms including Volk-
swagen’s WE, Mercedes-Benz’s Car2Go, BMW’s ReachNow, GM’s Maven, and Audi’s
Audi-on-Demand.
Carsharing companies can garner additional revenues from utilizing the battery packs
of their vehicle fleet to provide grid services. This chapter develops a rigorous queuing-
theoretic model and computational tools to facilitate the analysis and optimal coordination
of EV-based carsharing service platforms. Although queuing models have a long history
in modeling transportation services [33, 34, 35], including carsharing platforms [36], we
believe this is the first application to settings with EVs. The main goals in developing
our queuing-theoretic model for carsharing platforms are to (i) capture the salient features
of EV charging processes, and (ii) capture the tradeoffs in providing both transportation
and grid services. Indeed, the inherent time required to charge EV batteries will impact
a transportation service provider’s ability to deliver rides in a timely manner. Further, the
underlying cost and time requirements of battery charging will affect the pricing decisions
for mobility services.
In particular, we first establish a simple queuing model of EV transportation service
provision and recharge, further determining the revenue garnered. Next we consider the
possibility of using an EV battery to perform price arbitrage in an energy market; this
is done in the presence of a stochastic real-time wholesale market price signal through
a dynamic programming argument. Finally, we consider the possibility of (dynamically)
splitting the battery into a transportation segment and a grid services segment to enable en-
ergy price arbitrage when the vehicle is not delivering transportation services. For certain
standard distributional assumptions, we characterize the candidate optimal transportation
prices p upon fixing the battery capacity B dedicated to provide transportation services.
An efficient algorithm for joint optimization of (p,B) is given, and numerical examples
are used to provide insight into the basic tradeoff.
For ease of presentation and to capture the basic queuing-theoretic insights, we focus on
1Business-to-peer carsharing platforms provide short-term (e.g., hourly) car rentals, where the customer
drives the car provided by the company. On the other hand peer-to-peer ridesharing platforms, such as Lyft
and Uber, rely on privately-owned vehicles and their drivers to provide on-demand mobility to customers.
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energy services restricted to price arbitrage against real-time prices in the energy market.
We further focus on the setting where the fleet consists of a single car. Longer presenta-
tions of this work will include the setting with a variety of grid services and larger fleets
of cars.
3.2 Modeling transportation services
Let customers open A’s application following a Poisson process with intensity λ0. On
opening the application, a customer observes the posted price p (in money/time) for uti-
lizing A’s vehicle and the maximum driving time τmax = B/β−, assuming that the vehicle
battery of capacity B depletes at a constant rate β− when driven. The customer decides
to rent a vehicle if (i) the posted price p is lower than the customer’s reservation price,
and (ii) the customer’s required driving time τ does not exceed the maximum driving time
τmax. We model a customer’s reservation price and driving time as independent random
variables. Let Fπ denote the complementary cumulative or tail distribution function of the
reservation wages, and Fτ denote the cumulative distribution function of the trip times. It
follows that customers who are willing to pay the posted price and abide by the driving
time restrictions arrive according to a Poisson process with intensity
λ := λ0Fπ(p)Fτ(B/β−). (3.1)
Driving times of customers who ultimately avail themselves of A’s service follow the same
distribution as the driving times of all customers truncated at B/β−. The vehicle battery
loses β−τ amount of energy when driven for τ , where recall that β− denotes the battery




τ amount of time to charge it back up to its capacity B. Therefore, we
model the charging time proportional to the driving time as Fig. 3.1(a) illustrates. The
car (server) is deemed busy when it is either being driven or charging after being driven.
For each ride provided, the car remains busy for τ +τC = τ(1+β−/β+) := τβ̃ amount of
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Figure 3.1: (a) The relation between driving times, charging times, and busy times. (b)




:= β̃E[τ | τ ≤ B/β−]. (3.2)
Thus, A’s service has been modeled as an M/G/1 queue, written in Kendall’s notation,
with arrival rate λ and service rate µ . In our current formulation, we allow each arriving
customer to wait in the depot if the vehicle has been checked out by another customer. A
more realistic model with reneging or balking, and other behavioral models of customers
as in [37], are left to future endeavors.
Too low a price or too large a battery capacity can result in unstable growth in the









where fτ is the probability density function of driving times.
3.2.1 Computing A’s revenue rate from transport services
Drawing results from the equilibrium analysis of M/G/1 queues, we aim to calculate
the rate at which A accrues revenue, assuming the car service is in steady-state. From
renewal-reward theory, this rate is given by the ratio of the expected revenue A makes
from a busy period and the expected total cycle length (busy + idle period). We calculate
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the expected revenue during a busy period as follows. For each customer, A is paid pτ
for the transportation service, and it pays pretβ+τC = pretβ−τ for energy. Here, pret (in
money/energy) denotes the flat retail rate for energy that the distribution utility (or a retail
aggregator) charges A. Overall, A makes (p− pretβ−)τ from a customer who drives it for
τ time. Thus, the expected revenue from the customers in a busy period from transportation









where τ1, . . . ,τNT are the driving times of the NT customers in the busy period who seek to
use the car service. By Wald’s lemma, the above relation simplifies to
ΠT = (p− pretβ−)E[NT ] ·E[τ |τ ≤ B/β−]
= (p− pretβ−)
λ
µ−λ E[τ |τ ≤ B/β
−].
The last line in the above equation uses the fact that the expected length of the busy period
for an M/G/1 queue is given by (µ −λ )−1. Also, the expected length of the idle period













E[τ |τ ≤ B/β−].
Utilizing (3.1) and (3.2), we get
RT = λ 20 β̃ (p− pretβ−)F̄2π (p)Φ2τ(B/β−). (3.4)
Notice that we do not explicitly model A’s maintenance and repair costs for its vehicles.
One can expect repair costs to be proportional to the driving times, as the longer a car is
driven, the more prone it becomes to traffic accidents. Such costs can be included in the
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retail electricity price. Regular maintenance costs will add a constant to the revenue rate
that will not affect our conclusions from the model.
3.3 Price arbitrage using vehicle battery during idle periods
We aim to find how a vehicle can split its battery capacity for dual use—a portion set aside
to provide transportation services and the rest to maximize its revenue from arbitraging
against time-varying energy prices. To simplify the exposition, conceptually consider a
vehicle battery with capacity Btot as a combination of a transportation battery of capacity
B and a trading battery of capacity B′ = Btot−B.
Conceptually splitting the vehicle battery into two parts ensures that a transportation
customer who needs the vehicle for a trip always enjoys a nonrandom battery capacity.
Allowing the vehicle battery to provide grid services with the total battery capacity makes
the available battery for transportation a random quantity, compromising A’s carsharing
business. Any residual energy in the grid battery can be utilized by a transportation cus-
tomer in an emergency. Further, the battery split need not be constant, but can be varied
over time. For example, on days with high customer traffic, A might allocate a higher
portion of the battery for transportation as opposed to that in a day with low traffic.
Recall that the car is busy with transportation service when it is being driven by a cus-
tomer, or is preparing for it by charging its transportation battery. It is idle, otherwise.
During this idle period, let A receive nonnegative2 energy prices ρ (in money/capacity) at
regular intervals of length ∆ as shown in Fig. 3.1,(b). These prices may be the locational
marginal prices from a real-time wholesale market,3 or from an emergent retail market.
Notice that ρ is different from the flat retail energy price pret that A pays to charge its
transportation battery. A participates as a regular consumer of a distribution utility that
offers it a flat retail rate to charge its transportation battery. And during an idle period, A
participates as an owner-operator of a distributed energy resource (the vehicle battery) or
2The nonnegativity assumption on the prices can be relaxed with minor modifications to the results.
3While A needs a sufficiently large aggregate battery capacity to participate in a wholesale market, our
analysis on the utilization of one car battery reveals the dependency of the revenue rate on said battery
capacity and informs future work with multiple vehicles.
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one who relinquishes control over its trading battery to an aggregator of such resources.
A vehicle is connected to the grid when it charges its transportation battery. We insist
in our model that it does not arbitrage energy to accrue revenue during that period. That
is, we separate the times when the car provides or prepares for transportation services, and
when it takes part in price arbitrage. This separation facilitates easy auditing.
3.3.1 Optimal control for price arbitrage
We now formulate the question of expected revenue maximization from price arbitrage
with a battery of capacity B′ over an idle period as a discrete-time stochastic control prob-
lem. Suppose there are T intervals of length ∆ within an idle period, where recall that ∆ is
the time interval between consecutive price changes. Let ρ := (ρ0, . . . ,ρT−1) denote the
stochastic price process against which A maximizes its expected revenue from arbitrage.
Starting from a state of charge z0 ∈ [0,B′], the trading battery state at interval t progresses
as
zt+1 := zt +ut
for t = 0, . . . ,T − 1. Here, ut stands for the energy transacted at time t. A positive u
indicates charging the trading battery, and a negative one indicates discharging.
We seek a control policy γ := {γ0, . . . ,γT−1}, where γt maps the available information
at time t to the storage control action uγt . The relevant information for control design com-
prises the state at that time and the history of prices till that time. A policy is deemed
admissible, denoted γ ∈M (B′), if the induced control actions respect the capacity con-






almost surely for t = 0, . . . ,T − 1. The optimal expected revenue over an idle period of
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where E stands for the expectation computed with respect to the distribution on the prices.
In our next result, we provide a closed-form expression for the optimal revenue J∗(z0).
The proof in Appendix A relies on a dynamic programming based argument, adopted
from [38]. We use the notation z+ = max{z,0} in stating the result.
Proposition 5. The maximum expected revenue from price arbitrage with a trading battery







ρ j+1| j−ρ j
)+]
, (3.6)




is the one-step look-ahead price forecast, given the history of
prices till time t.
The derivation of the above result proves that the optimal storage control policy has a
threshold structure. It prescribes to charge the trading battery completely when the price
is expected to go up in the next time step, and to fully discharge it, otherwise.
Our model of storage operation for price arbitrage neglects three important consider-
ations. First, we do not model roundtrip efficiency losses. The results can be extended
to consider such losses, but are not modeled to maintain clarity of exposition. Second,
we do not model the effect of battery degradation from storage cycling. Vehicle batteries
have limited cycle life and replacement costs can be significant, e.g., see [39]. We aim
to address this modeling limitation in future work. Finally, we do not consider ramping
limitations on the battery’s charging and discharging abilities. One way to account for
ramping limitations is to constrain the split of the battery in a way that the trading battery
size is chargeable within ∆ time.
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3.3.2 Computing A’s revenue rate from price arbitrage
With the aid of Proposition 5, we now derive the revenue rate from energy trading that A
garners. To simplify the calculation, assume that the price process ρ is stationary. Then,




becomes independent of t. Denoting its expecta-
tion by 〈ρ̃〉, the expected revenue during an idle period becomes




where ∆ denotes the length of the pricing interval. We make two approximations in deriv-
ing ΠE . First, we ignore the contribution of the initial state of charge at the start of an idle
period to the revenue from arbitrage. Second, the number of pricing intervals T − 2 has
been approximated by T whose expectation is given by (λ∆)−1. If the number of pricing
intervals is sufficiently high within an idle period, these approximations are accurate.
The expected revenue in the above relation yields the following revenue rate from en-

















When splitting the vehicle battery for transportation and price arbitrage, a larger trading
battery size increases the arbitrage revenue in each idle period. Also, it leaves lesser ca-
pacity for transportation, leading to a decrease in the incoming traffic of customers seeking
transport, thereby increasing the idle time. The transportation price also has a similar ef-
fect on the revenue rate from energy trading in that it impacts the rate of arriving customers
that in turn affects the lengths of the idle periods.
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Figure 3.2: Variation of aggregate revenue rate with transportation price and battery allo-
cated for transportation. For this experiment, we chose λ0 = 1, Btot = 8, β− = 1, β+ = 7,
pret = 310 , and
〈ρ̃〉
∆
= 120 . Trip times and reservation wages were assumed to be exponen-
tially distributed with means 1, and 52 , respectively. The dashed line plots p
∗(B) in (3.7)
for each B ∈ [BL,Btot].
3.4 Splitting battery capacity for dual use
Having computed the revenue rate from transportation and energy trading for price arbi-
trage, we now derive how A can split its battery capacity to maximize its aggregate revenue
rate Rtot := RT +RE . Recall that we concluded Section 3.3 with the observation that the
transportation price p affects not only the revenue from transportation, but also the revenue
from price arbitrage. Hence, A seeks to jointly optimize its transportation price and the
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subject to λ0β̃Fπ(p)Φτ(B/β−)< 1,
p≥ 0, 0≤ B≤ Btot.
The stability constraint defines an open set. To avoid technical difficulties in optimizing
over such an open set, we take its closure with the understanding that the parameters are
suitably perturbed to make the closed set feasible.
Optimizing the aggregate revenue rate Rtot can be challenging, owing to its nonlinear
non-concave variation in the parameters p and B as Fig. 3.2 illustrates. In what follows,
we make additional assumptions on the trip times and identify structural properties of Rtot
that facilitate the development of an algorithm towards solving the above optimization
problem.
3.4.1 The case with exponentially distributed reservation prices
We characterize the candidate optimal transportation prices upon fixing the battery capac-
ity B dedicated to provide transportation services.
Proposition 6. Suppose the reservation prices for transportation customers are exponen-
tially distributed with mean 〈π〉. For a given B ∈ (0,Btot], the maximum of Rtot occurs at



























Proposition 6 is crucial to our design of an algorithm to compute the optimal battery split
B∗ and the optimal price p∗. Several remarks on the result are in order before presenting
its proof and the algorithm design. The ensuing discussion ignores the stability constraints
for the ease of exposition.
First, the Lambert-W function is a solution to the implicit equation W (xex) = x. For
x ∈ [−1/e,0), there are two solutions to that equation, both of which are negative. The
principal branch selects the one with the smallest absolute value; see [40] for details. As a
result, the candidate optimizer p∗(B) in (3.7) is no less than p0.
Second, notice that as B sweeps from the total battery capacity to zero, p1 increases
from zero to ∞. Said differently, A charges its passengers more as the size of the trading
battery Btot −B increases, both to compensate for reduced passenger car-requests and to
garner higher energy-trading revenue from increased idle times. Further, beyond a certain
size of the trading battery, p1 becomes large enough to make the argument inside the
Lambert-W function less than −1/e. Then p∗(B) in (3.7) no longer defines a candidate
optimizer. In other words, when the trading battery is large enough, marginally increasing
the trading battery will marginally increase the price-arbitrage profit, but this increase
is unable to cover A’s subsequent marginal loss in transportation revenue, and p∗ = ∞
becomes the only candidate optimizer for such B values. Therefore, p∗(B) in (3.7) is a




−(1+p0/〈π〉)φτ(BL/β−) = Btot. (3.8)
Third, p∗=∞ corresponds to the case that no customer avails A’s transportation service,
effectively reducing its vehicle to a static battery. It readily follows that A will simultane-
ously reduce B to zero, thus maximizing its revenue from energy trading.
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Fourth, setting B = Btot amounts to fully utilizing the vehicle battery for transportation.
In that case, the only candidate optimal transportation price becomes p0 that depends both
on the retail energy price and the mean reservation price. The higher the energy retail
price to charge its vehicles, the more A charges customers to compensate. The higher the
customers’ mean reservation price, the more A charges them to exploit it.
Proof of Proposition 6. We ignore the queue stability constraint in the rest of the proof.







〈π〉 + p0− p
)
,
where recall that fπ is the probability density function of the reservation prices. Therefore,
the derivative is positive at zero and for large p. The candidate maximizers of the aggregate
revenue are infinity and the roots of the derivative. These roots are the solutions of p1e
p
〈π〉+




〈π〉 (p0−p) =− p1〈π〉e
p0
〈π〉 .
Applying W on both sides, we infer that the above relation has at most two solutions. A
candidate maximizer of Rtot is the smallest root, given by (3.7). Further, W is only well-
defined over negative arguments in [−1/e,0), leveraging which, the inequality identifying
a potential optimizer in (3.7) follows.
3.4.2 Algorithm to optimize transportation price and battery split
Proposition 6 allows us to design the following algorithm to optimize the transportation
price and the battery split for dual use. For convenience, we use the notation Rtot(p,B) to
make explicit the dependency of the aggregate revenue rate on p and B.
• Compute BL in (3.8) using a bisection search over [0,Btot].
• Maximize Rtot(p∗(B),B) over [BL,Btot] using projected gradient descent with dimin-
ishing step sizes, starting from (BL+Btot)/2. Call the optimizers p∗,1,B∗,1.
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• If Rtot(∞,0)>Rtot(p∗,1,B∗,1), then return p∗=∞,B∗= 0. Otherwise, return p∗,1,B∗,1.
We cannot guarantee that the gradient method converges to the true optimizer in general.
It does so for the numerical experiments described next.
3.4.3 Variation of optimal solution with problem parameters
Figure 3.3 illustrates the variation of the optimal revenue rate R∗tot and the transportation
battery capacity B∗ at optimality with various problem parameters. As one expects, A in-
vests all its battery for grid services for low customer traffic (low λ0). The part dedicated
to transportation increases with the customer traffic up to a point, after which transporta-
tion becomes more attractive than grid services. Similarly, the longer the expected trip
times 〈τ〉, the higher the revenue the platform accrues from transportation. Therefore,
when trip times become high enough the battery is allocated fully to carsharing services.
Next, recall that 〈ρ̃〉/∆ equals the expected gain from energy arbitrage with unit battery
capacity, and its effect on B∗ is exactly opposite to that of λ0 and 〈τ〉. As 〈ρ̃〉/∆ increases,
grid services become more rewarding, and thus our algorithm favors a battery split against
transportation services, reducing it to zero when the grid profits become high enough.
Figure 3.3: Variation of the optimal revenue rate and battery split with 〈ρ̃〉/∆, 〈τ〉 and λ0.
Other parameters are the same as used for Figure 3.2.
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3.5 Chapter summary and future research suggestions
This chapter defines a framework to analyze carsharing services that can utilize the vehi-
cle battery for grid services when the car is idle. The framework conceptually splits the
battery capacity into two parts—one solely for transportation services and the other for
grid services. To keep the analysis concrete, the focus is on using the battery for price
arbitrage against real-time prices during A’s idle periods. Leveraging equilibrium analysis
of queues, we characterize the revenue rate of such a platform as a function of the price it
charges its transport customers and the battery split. We further provide an algorithm to
compute the optimal prices and battery split for exponentially distributed trip times, and
use it to study the dependency of the optimal revenue rate and the resulting battery split on
various system parameters.
We aim to extend our analysis to the case where the carsharing company A commands
a fleet with more than one vehicle. This work has ignored the possibility that A maintains
more than one charging depot across a city resulting in a queuing network—an interesting
consideration for future work. Spatio-temporal variations in demand often lead carsharing
systems to have excess cars in one location, and a paucity in another. We aim to extend
our analysis, accounting for rebalancing costs among depots through appropriate incentive
mechanisms, e.g., in [41]. This work only considers vehicle batteries to garner revenues
from price arbitrage; we will consider alternate grid services that the ‘grid’ battery might
provide. Finally, we wish to utilize our framework and data from carsharing services to




Electrification of two transportation sharing economy business models, namely the ride-
and carsharing models, were investigated. For the first case, drivers are presented with
two choices, either transportation or grid service provision. Based on the price for each
service posted by the ridesharing company, drivers choose to provide either service. The
higher the price for grid services, the more the drivers who choose to serve the grid; but
higher compensation from the company, combined with the saturating nature of the con-
tract assumed, yields losses for the company after a threshold of drivers serving the grid is
surpassed.
For the carsharing case, the battery of the electric vehicle was conceptually split in two:
the transportation and the grid part. The car can only participate in vehicle-to-grid ser-
vices when it is idle and fully charged. Allocating higher grid capacity leads to increased
vehicle-to-grid service gains and lower transportation service gains, and vice versa. Profit




PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
Consider the optimal value functions
J∗T−1(z,ρ≤T−1) :=maximumu
−ρT−1u,











subject to 0 ≤ z + u ≤ B′.
(A.2)
for t = 0, . . . ,T − 2. By [42, Proposition 1.3.1], the parametric optimizers of the above














Next, we prove the following using backward induction.















B′− zt , if ρt ≤ ρt+1|t ,−zt , otherwise
(A.4)
for each z ∈ [0,B′] and price sequence ρ . The proof of (A.4) for t = T − 2 is immediate
from utilizing (A.3) in (A.2). To proceed with the backward induction, assume next that
(A.4) holds for times t + 1, . . . ,T − 2. We prove that it holds at time t. To that end, the
definition of J∗t in (A.2) yields
J∗t (z,ρ≤k) = maximumu
κ(z,u),


























ρ j+1| j−ρ j
)+ ∣∣∣∣ ρ≤t
 .
The last line follows from the law of total expectation. The above readily yields the opti-
mizer u∗ of (A.5), and in turn, the optimal policy γ∗t in (A.4). Plugging that optimizer in
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the expression for κ , we get




















ρ j+1| j−ρ j
)+ ∣∣∣∣ ρ≤t
 ,
proving (A.4), and the proposition.
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